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Abstract 
 
This paper reports on a simulated phishing 
experiment targeting 6,938 faculty and staff at 
George Mason University. The study examined 
various possible predictors of phishing susceptibility. 
The focus of the present paper is on demographic 
factors (including age, gender and 
position/employment). Since previous studies of age 
and gender have yielded discrepant results, one 
purpose of the study was to disambiguate these 
findings. A second purpose was to compare different 
types of email phishing exploits. A third objective was 
to compare the effect of different types of feedback 
given to those who clicked on one or more of three 
simulated phishing exploits that were deployed over a 
three-week period. Our analysis of demographic 
factors, effects of phishing email content, and effects 
of repeated exposure to phishing exploits revealed 
significant age effects, marginally significant gender 
differences, and significant differences in email type. 
A multi-level model estimated effects of multiple 
variables simultaneously. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Phishing attacks—social engineering exploits 
using digital means—are unintentional insider threats 
[6] that can result in serious financial impacts and/or 
losses of confidential information. These exploits 
cause grave damage to both commercial and US 
government entities—such as the now infamous 
cyber/phishing attack against the US Government 
Office of Personnel Management that gave attackers 
access to sensitive data on millions of government 
employees and contractors. Phishing attacks targeted 
on US organizations increased more than 40% in 
2018 [12]; the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center 
reported 2018 complaints amounting to losses of over 
$1.2 billion for business email compromises, and, 
more generally, $2.7 billion in Internet crime losses – 
nearly twice the financial impact of 2017 [3].  
Research on factors that affect people’s 
susceptibility to phishing is an essential step in 
improving cybersecurity awareness and designing 
protective strategies. Research has revealed 
numerous personal or demographic factors that are 
related to phishing susceptibility [7]. However, there 
is a lack of agreement among studies that differ in 
methods and populations studied. A primary purpose 
of this paper was to disambiguate some of the 
discrepant findings on demographic factors 
(particularly age and gender) and to compare effects 
of different phishing email content on phishing 
susceptibility. The study also examined possible 
effects of different types of feedback given to those 
who clicked on one or more of three simulated 
phishing exploits that were deployed over a three-
week period.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews previous phishing susceptibility 
studies; Section 3 presents the research questions for 
this study; Section 4 describes the design of the 
phishing study; Section 5 discusses the results of the 
phishing susceptibility analysis; Section 6 discusses 
the key findings, contributions and limitations of this 
study; and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related research  
 
2.1. Previous phishing study results 
 
A typical phishing study includes simulated 
phishing campaigns, surveys, or both. Simulated 
phishing attacks generally do not inform users that 
they are participating in a phishing study. A study 
may provide a warning of possible phishing exploits 
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to evaluate the effectiveness of warnings. For 
example, Mohebzada et al. [11] conducted two 
phishing email experiments targeting 10,568 faculty, 
staff and students at the American University of 
Sharjah during the spring semester in 2010. They sent 
out warning notifications after running 18 hours of 
the campaign and found the warning messages were 
largely ignored, suggesting that warnings may not be 
sufficient to prevent users from falling for phishing.  
Survey studies typically inform participants of the 
study’s purpose before distributing the survey. For 
example, Sheng et al. [13] recruited 1001 online 
participants through Amazon.com’s Mechanical 
Turk, who then answered survey questions and 
completed a roleplay task; the study examined 
demographic factors and the effectiveness of 
different anti-phishing training materials.  
Two recent phishing studies included both 
experiments and surveys. In spring 2018, Diaz et al. 
[1] launched a phishing email experiment to study 
demographic factors related to phishing at the 
University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC). 
They sent out simulated phishing attacks targeting 
1,350 undergraduate students who were not informed 
before the experiment. A survey was sent after the 
experiment to analyze some additional demographic 
factors such as computer usage time and anti-
phishing training experience. Another recent example 
is a study by Greene et al. [5], who launched three 
phishing exercises (Mar, Aug, Dec) targeting 
approximately 70 staff at the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology. The purpose was to study 
the reasons why email users were clicking or not 
clicking on phishing links and attachments. They also 
conducted three post-exercise surveys corresponding 
to each phishing exploit and compared survey 
responses between clickers and non-clickers.  
Below we describe findings associated with 
phishing and, as motivation and background for the 
present study, point out several issues that may 
contribute to discrepant or ambiguous results.  
 
2.2. Factors related to phishing susceptibility 
 
2.2.1. Gender. Inconsistent results have been 
reported in previous studies of the relationship 
between gender and phishing susceptibility. Jagatic et 
al. [9], Sheng et al. [13], and Halevi et al. [8] 
indicated that women were significantly more likely 
to fall for phishing than men. In contrast, Mohebzada 
et al. [11] found males and females were equally 
likely to fall for the first phase of a phishing attack, 
but more males (60.9%) were deceived in the second 
phase of their phishing attack than females (39.1%). 
Diaz et al. [1] found that 3% more males than 
females clicked on the phishing email, although this 
difference was not statistically significant. Further 
study of gender effects is warranted to deconflict 
these results. 
 
2.2.2. Age. Inconsistent results have also been 
reported on the association between age and phishing 
susceptibility. Some key methodological differences 
in relevant studies may account for this. In an online 
survey and role-playing study involving a university 
population, Sheng et al. [13] found that subjects in 
the 18-25 age range were more likely to click on the 
phishing emails than people in other age groups (26-
35, 36-45, 46-55, and over 55). In contrast, the 
university study by Downs et al. [2] found no 
significant association between age and behaviors 
exhibited in their email role playing study, although 
they found that younger people engaged in more 
risky online activities. Their sample included students, 
faculty and staff ranging from 18-45 years old.  
Several other studies reported findings on age 
factors that appear to differ from the above studies, 
but there are important differences in how these 
studies categorized age groups. In the Mohebzada et 
al. [11] simulated phishing experiment targeting 
university faculty, staff and students, no relationship 
was found between “age” and phishing susceptibility-
-but the age range in this study was defined by 
undergraduate level (freshman, sophomore, junior, 
senior), with a “typical” age range from 18-21 years 
old. Similarly, in the Jagatic et al. [9] phishing email 
experiment conducted at Indiana University targeting 
students aged 18-24 years old, younger users were 
slightly more likely to be successfully phished. The 
age categories in [11] and [9] correspond to the 
lowest age category examined by Sheng et al. [13] 
and Downs et al. [2], and therefore these results are 
not necessarily inconsistent.  
With regard to age effects, the evidence seems to 
suggest that the younger age categories are more 
susceptible to phishing than older age groups. 
However, the discrepancies in methods and 
populations studied, as well as possible confounding 
factors that were not addressed (e.g. experience), 
point to a need for a more careful study of age effects 
that controls for possible confounding variables.  
 
2.2.3. Phishing email content. Previous research 
indicates that the address of the sender and email 
content affect user response to email. Furnell [4] 
indicates that content characteristics, such as visual 
factors (logos and banners) may entice people to 
click on a phishing email. Jagatic et al. [9] suggest 
that a sender address from the university domain 
lowers students’ guard. Greene et al. [5] argue that 
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the alignment of user context and the phishing attack 
premise is a significant factor in phishing 
susceptibility. Vishwanath et al. [14] found the level 
of attention to urgency cues or to email subject lines 
significantly affects clicking response to phishing 
emails; however, levels of attention to grammar or 
spelling were significantly less likely to affect users 
being phished. The importance of visual and other 
cues is clearly a topic for further investigation.  
 
2.2.4. Feedback type. A limited amount of research 
has been directed toward the impact of previous 
experience with phishing. Sheng et al. [13] reported 
that their survey participants who had previous anti-
phishing training experience were less likely to fall 
for phishing attacks. Effects of feedback or learning 
effects may be studied in surveys, through self-
reporting, or they may be examined in more 
longitudinal approaches that determine if prior 
exposure to phishing impacts future behavior. This is 
one of the questions addressed in the present study.  
 
3. Research questions  
 
As we noted in the previous section, the various 
studies relating to demographic (and some 
contextual) factors have yielded somewhat 
inconsistent results. A more complete list of relevant 
research topics ([6], [7]) includes the effects of 
demographics factors, email content/visual cues, 
previous experience with phishing, level of 
sophistication in using computers or internet 
experience, and human behavioral/psychological 
factors. The study reported here examined each of 
these topics to some degree, but the present paper 
focuses on the first three research needs; findings 
relating to the other topics will be reported in future 
papers. Thus, the present paper reports on the 
following research questions:  
 
Research Question 1: Will the experience of 
succumbing to a phishing email and subsequent 
feedback impact future behavior? We ask if users 
who obtain explanatory feedback after clicking on a 
phishing email will be less likely to click on a 
phishing email in the future, and whether the nature 
of the feedback (a brief message or a video landing 
page) will affect the likelihood of succumbing to a 
subsequent phishing attack.  
 
Research Question 2: Regarding effects of 
demographic factors, 
(a) will there be differences in susceptibility to 
phishing (as measured by likelihood of clicking 
on a phishing email) based on age? We are 
particularly interested in whether there will be 
significant age effects, after statistically 
adjusting for other possible factors. 
(b) will there be gender effects? We suspect that the 
effect of gender will be minimal, if at all. We do 
not expect to find large differences in clicking 
behavior in response to phishing emails, after 
statistically adjusting for other possible factors. 
(c) will there be differences in susceptibility to 
phishing based on employment category 
(position/department)? We are particularly 
interested in the nature of this possible effect, 
after statistically adjusting for other factors. 
 
Research Question 3: Will the content of phishing 
emails (source of message, visual cues) impact the 
likelihood of responding to the exploit? Previous 
research suggests that certain characteristics of a 
phishing email may affect clicking behavior (e.g., 
[5]). We focus on the type or source (IT/tech support, 
package delivery, credit card warning) that presents 
different message content or context. Since the IT 
tech support context may be more relevant to users, 
we expect that more users will click on the IT tech 
support email than the other two types of email. 
 
4. Method  
 
We designed and conducted an experimental 
study targeting 6,938 faculty and staff at George 
Mason University to identify the characteristics of 
users who are susceptible to phishing. We distributed 
three simulated phishing emails over a period of three 
weeks, from October 30 to November 21 of 2018.  
Study weeks started on Tuesdays and ended on 
Mondays. All data in this study was de-identified to 
protect personally identifiable information [10]. 
Our experimental design included varying types 
of simulated email scams: one related to IT/tech 
support, one related to finance/banking, and one 
related to e-commerce/package delivery. This 
allowed us to examine possible differences in 
vulnerability across these phishing email types. Users 
in our study received three different phishing emails 
– IT/help desk (IT), Package Delivery (PD), and 
Credit Card Warning (CC)-- each in a different week 
and on a different day of the week. People who 
clicked on the simulated phishing link were taken to a 
randomly chosen landing page (LP). Three different 
LPs were designed: a “page not found,” a brief 
message informing users that the email was part of a 
phishing study, and a similar message with a short 
anti-phishing training video. In addition to the 
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simulated phishing attack, we collected Human 
Resource (HR) data to enable an analysis of 
demographic factors. 
Prior to initiating the campaign, the university 
administration required that a pre-phish email be sent 
notifying users that they may receive email messages 
as part of a phishing test. This email also cautioned 
users against clicking links or visiting URLs if a 
message is suspected to be a phish. Because there 
was no warning on individual phishing emails, the 
IRB approved a waiver of informed consent but 
required a deception notice to be sent after study 
completion. Therefore, we sent subjects a debriefing 
email to explain that the simulated phishing emails 
were part of an experiment for research purposes 
with no security risks that would make them 
vulnerable to any threats. Users could indicate a 
desire not to have their data used for the study. 
 
4.1. Study population 
 
Of the 6,938 participants in this study, 46% were 
male and 54% were female. We excluded 17 people 
who were involved with the design of the study and 
11 who opted out of the study. The 27-41 year old 
age group had the highest proportion of participants 
(31%), while the youngest age group (less than 27 
years old) had the smallest proportion (9.3%). The 
proportions of technical faculty, other faculty, and 
administrative staff were 15.5%, 45.1%, and 39.4%, 
respectively. The most notable gender difference was 
the much higher proportion of males than females 
among technical faculty over age 59.  
 
4.2. Data overview 
 
We used Human Resource records for faculty and 
staff to identify demographic factors, including age, 
gender, position, and department type. Age groups 
were defined so that there would be no singly 
identifiable personnel using other demographic 
information. We broke down the position factor into 
adjunct faculty, full-time faculty, wages staff and 
other staff. The department type is broken down into 
administration, technical college, and other college. 
Technical college includes employees in engineering 
and science; remaining non-administration 
employees are categorized as other college.  
To collect users’ click behavior reflecting their 
susceptibility to phishing emails, we used an open 
source phishing framework called Gophish [15], 
intended to help organizations test their own 
exposure to phishing. The Gophish application sent 
simulated phishing emails, directed clickers to the 
appropriate LP, and recorded the data.  
Other data collected in this study included 
technical data such as VPN and firewall logs; a pre-
campaign survey on technical/cybersecurity-related 
experience and psychological/behavioral/personality 
factors; and a final survey, after the conclusion of the 
phishing campaigns, asking more in-depth questions 
about the phishing emails, reasons for clicking and/or 
not clicking the email links, and the user’s usual 
behavior when receiving or reacting to such emails. 
Since here we are focused primarily on demographic 
factors, the analysis and reporting on these 
relationships are planned for a future publication. 
  
4.3. Simulated phishing campaign 
 
We designed three phishing emails in different 
contexts with urgency cues to stimulate users to click 
on a link: 
• IT Helpdesk (IT). An IT helpdesk email notifies 
the user that there had been suspicious activity 
overnight, which caused the account to be 
deactivated. The user is instructed to click a link 
to review the activity and reactivate the account.  
• Package Delivery (PD). A package delivery 
service email is sent to users describing a failed 
package delivery due to invalid postal code. The 
user is instructed to click on the link to download 
the shipping label that must be brought to the 
post office to pick up the package.  
• Credit Charge Warning (CC). An email 
notifies users of a suspicious charge on a credit 
card, for which large purchase notifications are 
enabled. The user is asked to click a link to 
review the charge and change notification 
settings.  
 
We purchased domain names for each of the 
sender accounts. We purposefully assigned plausible 
names that would be somewhat suspicious to careful 
users. The domain name for the IT helpdesk email 
was “support@masonhelpdesk.com” as opposed to 
the actual university IT email account, and the 
package delivery email was sent from the fictitious 
“pkginfo@vapostal.com.” The credit card email was 
sent from “service@acubank.co”, which has a “.co” 
instead of a “.com” address.  
The goal was to send each user all three emails. 
However, there was a concern that if a user receives 
all three emails or if all users received the same email 
on the same day (or week), it would raise suspicion 
about the emails and be less effective as a result. To 
minimize potential suspicion and to counterbalance 
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potentially confounding factors such as day of week 
and order of receipt, we created nine user groups (A1, 
A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3) using stratified 
sampling to make sure each group has similar age, 
gender, and department type composition. We sent 
each group one email per week on a different day of 
the week. This way, each group would receive all 
three emails, but on a different day of each week 
(Table 1). In this paper, we consider week 1, week 2, 
and week 3 as the sequence of three weeks. 
The email campaigns were terminated on 
November 21, giving each email at least a full week 
to be opened and clicked by each user. We recorded 
the operating system and time of the clicks so that we 
could link the click behavior to IT data and identify 
technical indicators that suggest susceptibility to 
phishing. If a user made multiple clicks on an email, 
we recorded the time of the first click. 
To examine the impact of feedback given after 
clicking on a phishing link, we varied the Landing 
Page (LP) to which the user was redirected after 
clicking the link. We were interested in any 
differences in the impact of LP on subsequent 
behavior (i.e., the likelihood of clicking on a 
subsequent phishing email). Users who clicked on a 
phishing link were redirected at random to one of 
three LPs: (a) a standard 404 (“Page Not Found”) 
error that does not notify the user that he or she has 
clicked on a phishing link; (b) a webpage that 
displays a simple message notifying the user that he 
or she has clicked on a simulated phishing link from 
the study; (c) a webpage that notifies the user that he 
or she has clicked on a phishing link from the study, 
explains the study, and provides a training video on 
how to identify suspicious emails. Thus, the training 
video provided the most educational feedback, and 
the “Page Not Found” 404 message provided the 
least informative feedback. For those who clicked on 
the link multiple times, we used HTTP cookies to 
implement a script that would ensure that they would 
see the same LP each time, as long as they were 
using the same device or browser. For the few users 
who used different devices and therefore saw 
different LPs for the same email, we recorded the 
“strongest” LP that was experienced. 
Our LP research question may be described using 
two hypotheses: 1) users who receive notification 
about clicking on a phishing link would be less likely 
to click on a future link, and 2) users who receive a 
stronger notification (i.e., training video LP) would 
be less likely to click on a future link than those who 
received a simple message notification. To ensure a 
sufficient sample size for the first hypothesis 
mentioned above, we set the probability distribution 
for simple message LP to be 25%, training video LP 
to be 25%, and standard 404 LP to be 50%. 
 
5. Results  
 
The statistical methodologies applied in this study 
are the Chi-square test for independence at 
significance level α=0.05, Cramer’s V to test strength 
of that significance, and multiple pairwise 
comparisons for proportions with Bonferroni 
correction. For the Chi-square test, the null 
hypothesis is that there is no association between the 
test variable and the clicking result. For the 
proportions test, our null hypothesis is that there is no 
difference between the test proportions. 
 
5.1. Click behavior and landing page 
 
5.1.1. Landing page analysis. We examined the LP 
data to assess whether clickers learned from the LP to 
be more alert when receiving the next simulated 
phishing email. We conducted two types of LP 
analysis to investigate our hypothesis: First we 
checked to see if clickers who received a brief 
message or a video LP from the first two weeks are 
less likely to click on email link in the third week 
(results shown in Table 2). For the second analysis, 
we explored the effectiveness of the video LP by 
comparing the click rates in the future week by 
different LPs that people received from the first two 
weeks (results shown in Table 3). 
For the first analysis (Table 2), we considered 
the strongest LP variable with three levels: 404 page, 
brief message and video page, and no LP. No LP 
indicates the user did not click the link in the email 
from the previous week. This would mean they did 
not see any LP. Although we hypothesized that users 
may learn from the notification on the LP, we found 
no statistically significant difference in the week 3 
click rate between users who received the 404 LP 
versus those who received some form of notification 
(brief message or video) in previous weeks. On the 
other hand, comparing the click rate for 404 (or 
Table 1. Phishing campaign schedule 
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combined message and video) with no LP, we found 
a highly significant difference: clickers were more 
likely to be repeat-clickers than non-clickers were to 
become clickers (Table 3). In other words, previous 
week non-clickers are significantly less likely to click 
than previous week clickers. 
The second LP analysis focused on the 
effectiveness of the video. We found no significant 
difference between click behavior across the 
strongest LP variable with three levels, 404 page, 
brief message, and video page (Table 3 and Table 4). 
Specifically, the video LP did not contribute to a 
lower click rate, contrary to our initial hypothesis. 
 
5.1.2. Week-to-week click rate. In another analysis, 
we observed a decreasing trend for the week-to-week 
click rate. 719 users (10.4%) clicked on the week 1 
simulated phishing email. 617 users (8.9%) clicked 
on the week 2 email. 539 users (7.8%) clicked on the 
week 3 email. However, the decreases in click rate 
from one week to the next were significant only for 
users who did not click in the previous week (Table 
5). In other words, previous week non-clickers are 
less likely to click than previous week clickers. We 
hypothesize that this occurs because removing users 
who were successfully phished in the previous week 
results in a population less susceptible to being 
phished. Lack of a statistically significant decrease in 
click rate among those who did click in a previous 
week may reflect lack of an effect or insufficient 
power/sample size. 
Table 2. Two types of landing page analysis 
 
LP Analysis Type 1 Strongest Landing Page 
 404 Msg + 
video 
No LP 
W3 Clicked 99 119 321 
W3 Did not click 408 563 5428 
Total 507 682 5749 
Click Rate 19.53% 17.45% 5.58% 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Click Rate 
(%) 
Lower 
Bound 
16.31 14.78 5.02 
Upper 
Bound 
23.20 20.48 6.21 
LP Analysis Type 2 Strongest Landing Page 
 404 Msg Video 
W3 Clicked 99 57 62 
W3 Did not click 408 276 287 
 507 333 349 
Click Rate 19.53% 17.12 % 17.77% 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Click Rate 
(%) 
Lower 
Bound 
16.31 13.45 14.11 
Upper 
Bound 
23.20 21.53 22.12 
 
Table 4. Multiple pairwise comparisons for proportions 
with Bonferroni correction 
 
Table 5. Week-to-week click rate by LPs 
 
 
 
Table 3. LP analysis: Result of Chi-square test for 
independence  
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5.2. Click behavior and email content 
 
5,421 users (78.1%) did not click on any 
simulated phishing emails. 1,517 users (21.7%) 
clicked at least one email. 1,192 users (17.2%) 
clicked on only one email, 268 users (3.9%) clicked 
on two emails, 57 users (0.8%) clicked on all three. 
Of the 1,517 users who clicked on at least one email, 
424 (6.11% of all users) clicked the CC email, 826 
(11.91% of all users) clicked the IT email and 649 
(9.35% of all users) clicked the PD email (Table 6). 
There is a significant difference between the click 
rates for any two emails. As we hypothesized, the IT 
help desk email tricked the largest proportion of 
users, followed by the package. 
 
Table 6. Click behavior by email type 
 
5.3. Demographic variables 
 
We examined click rates for each demographic 
category directly. Figures 1 and 2 show 95% 
confidence intervals for click rate by demographic 
(age and gender) and employment (department type 
and position) factors.  
The Chi-squared test shows a significant 
relationship between age or position and click 
behavior (Table 7). Table 4 shows that people over 
59 years old are more likely to fall for phishing but 
contrary to our initial hypothesis, we did not find that 
people in the youngest age group were significantly 
more likely to fall for the phishing emails. 
We found adjunct faculty are significantly more 
susceptible to phishing than full-time faculty and 
wages staff, and marginally more likely to click than 
other staff at significance level 0.05 (Table 4), which 
may be explained by that a higher proportion of older 
people (29.5%) is identified in adjunct faculty than 
other job categories (full-time: 24.5%; other: 14.5%; 
wages: 16.6%). Wages staff are significantly less 
likely to be phished than people in other positions. 
We found there is a marginally significant association    
between gender and phishing susceptibility at 
significance level 0.05 (Table 7). 
Males had a slightly higher click rate. Since the 
sample size is large, the Cramer’s V values show a 
relatively weak relationship between the click 
behavior and each demographic variable, but the 
differences are statistically significant. There is no 
statistically significant association between 
department type and phishing susceptibility. We 
found no evidence indicating that employees from 
technical colleges are less likely to fall for phishing 
than from other departments. 
 
5.4. Demographic variables and email content 
   
To investigate the relationship between demographic 
variables and email content, we analyzed the users 
who clicked on each type of phishing link. Figs. 3 
and 4 show click rates and 95% confidence intervals 
for each type of email content by demographic and 
employment factors. Among the clickers, we 
observed that males are more likely to click on the 
credit card email than females. Pairwise comparison 
of proportions (Table 4) suggests users in the oldest 
group (above 59 years old) are more likely to click on 
Table 7. Demographic variables analysis: Result of 
Chi-square test for independence 
 
 
Figure 1. Click rate and 95% confidence interval by 
demographic factors 
 
Figure 2. Click rate and 95% confidence interval by 
employment factors 
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the credit card email than people aged 27 to 59. 
Users in the youngest age group (less than 27 
years old) are significantly more likely to click on the 
credit card email than people aged between 27 and 41. 
Our analysis also suggests users in the oldest age 
group are significantly more likely to fall for IT help 
desk email and package delivery email than other 
groups. Our analysis shows that adjunct faculty are 
significantly more likely to click on the credit card 
email than the full-time faculty and wages staff. 
Adjunct faculty are significantly more susceptible to 
the IT help desk email than people in other positions. 
Full-time faculty are more likely to click on the 
package delivery email than wages staff. We found 
no other differences that were statistically significant. 
There is no significant difference in proportion of 
people who clicked on a particular email by 
department type. 
 
5.5. Multi-level model 
   
Univariate and bivariate analyses have the 
potential for confounds. For example, in samples 
where males tend to be younger, the univariate effect 
of age may be caused by gender differences (or vice 
versa). Multivariate statistics can separate the effect of 
variables when entered into the same model. Another 
potential confound for the univariate statistical 
analysis used in this study is the effect of time. 
Extending our hypothetical example, if young male 
staff happen to respond to email more quickly than 
older female faculty, and if responding quickly is 
related to phishing susceptibility, then a univariate 
effect for age, gender, or position would actually be 
explained by time (response latency). We conducted a 
separate analysis of the factors examined in this study 
using a multi-level logit model including all variables 
simultaneously to better isolate the effects of these 
factors. Using this approach, the effects of time, age, 
gender, position, and LP are estimated for each of the 
 
Figure 4. Click rate and 95% confidence interval for each email content by employment factors 
 
 
Figure 3. Click rate and 95% confidence interval for each email content by demographic factors 
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email types (Table 8). Two conclusions are consistent 
across email type: university employees are less likely 
to click as time passes and those who have clicked 
before are more likely to click again. This second 
finding is consistent with univariate results. The effect 
of age does seem to vary by email type (as in the 
bivariate statistics), such that the over 59 year old age 
group tend to be more susceptible to the IT email, 
whereas the youngest age group seems to be more 
susceptible to the banking email. The effect of gender 
(male susceptibility) does seem to be independent 
from the effect of age for the banking email, where 
the other email types have no significant gender 
effects. Adjunct faculty seem to have a significant 
susceptibility to the IT email with the added effect of 
adjunct faculty and other staff having somewhat 
higher susceptibility to the banking email. Finally, the 
feedback intervention was only successful for the 
banking email: those who saw a LP were less likely to 
click again than those having seen a 404 error.  
 
Table 8. Fixed effects for a multi-level logit model 
predicting susceptibility for three email types. 
 IT PD CC 
(Intercept) -5.90*** -6.53*** -6.61*** 
Time -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
27-41 -0.16 -0.36* -0.52** 
41-49 -0.06 -0.37* -0.51* 
49-59 -0.15 -0.15 -0.33† 
59+ 0.28* 0.30† -0.04 
Female 0.06 -0.06 -0.21* 
Full-time -0.46*** 0.15 -0.34* 
Other -0.38*** 0.07 -0.05 
Wage -0.50*** -0.21 -0.40* 
Prior click 1.06*** 1.16*** 1.32*** 
Message -0.26 0.02 0.09 
Video 0.05 -0.04 -0.78** 
These results further aid interpretation of findings 
regarding demographic variables predictive of 
phishing susceptibility. Statistical control supported 
the independent effect of age, position, and gender 
though these effects depended on email type. The 
analysis further supported the effect of the video 
feedback intervention for certain email types. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The best predictor of phishing susceptibility may 
be having been phished before. Individuals who 
clicked on a previous week’s email are significantly 
more likely than non-clickers to click on the next 
week’s email. Contrary to our initial hypothesis, we 
found varied effects of LP on subsequent week 
behavior. It is possible that those most susceptible to 
phishing are also those unlikely to patiently 
read/view feedback. The positive finding for the 
banking email may reflect that any feedback effect 
may only apply to high stakes scenarios (i.e., falling 
for a banking scam [fiscal damage] is likely more 
impactful than an IT scam [computer damage]). This 
should be investigated in the future.  
There was a statistically significant association 
between age or position and phishing susceptibility. 
Department type is not significantly related to 
phishing susceptibility. The effect of gender was less 
consistent with previous literature. We found that 
gender is a small significant factor, which contradicts 
the result in Mohebzada et al. [11] and Diaz et al. [1], 
although they found a non-significant higher rate for 
males. Additionally, even though Jagatic et al. [9], 
Sheng et al. [13], and Halevi et al. [8] indicated that 
gender is a significant factor in phishing 
susceptibility, the direction of our result is 
inconsistent with their results claiming that females 
are more likely to click [8][9][13]. Furthermore, 
considering the gender click behavior by each email 
content, our result shows that males are significantly 
more likely to click on the financial email than 
females. Individuals in the youngest age group (less 
than 27 years old) are significantly more likely to 
click on the financial email than people aged between 
27 and 41. Those in the oldest age group (greater than 
59 years old) are significantly more likely to click on 
the financial email than people aged 27 to 59, and 
moreover, they are more likely to fall for IT help 
desk email and package delivery email than other 
groups. Our findings suggest that people over 59 
years old may be the most vulnerable group to all 
three phishing email content types.  
There were more clickers on the IT help desk 
email than the other two emails. This result may 
suggest that university employees pay more attention 
to emails related to their work context, which is 
consistent with findings from Greene et al. [5]. The 
financial email fooled the smallest proportion of 
users, which may suggest that people are more alert 
to the emails that come from an unfamiliar bank that 
they were not enrolled. As the domain name of the 
financial email ended by “.co” instead of “.com”, this 
may also explain the smaller proportion of users who 
were deceived by the financial content. The urgency 
cues [10] in the three emails might triggered users to 
believe they are genuine emails. This phenomenon 
will be investigated in our post-experiment survey.  
Our study design had several important aspects 
that help to disambiguate results of previous studies 
and clarify implications for IT policy and practice: 
(a) Varying phishing email types. We used three 
types of simulated phishing emails (one related to 
IT/tech support, one related to finance/banking, and 
one related to e-commerce/package delivery) to 
increase the generality of findings and assess any 
differences in vulnerability to different types of email 
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phishing exploits. (b) Stratified sampling of users. 
Users were grouped by stratified sampling to ensure 
each user would receive all emails but in different 
days in three weeks, to reduce influence of possible 
confounding factors. (c) Large-scale study. This 
study used a large number of subjects and a wide age 
range of users, enabling us to disambiguate some of 
the discrepant findings previously reported on 
demographic factors.  
Some possible limitations of this study should be 
considered in planning future research. While the 
multivariate statistical models allowed variables to be 
tested while controlling for all other variables, it is 
still possible that unmeasured variables may be the 
underlying cause of some the relationships. First, for 
the clickers who received the message or the video 
LP in the previous week, we did not evaluate how 
carefully they read the message or watched the 
embedded anti-phishing training video. In the post-
study survey, we asked if people watched the video 
and found that click behavior has no significant 
relationship with whether people viewed the video 
(although this result is restricted to survey 
respondents). A second limitation is that the results 
related to the email content analysis are restricted to 
the specific email designs that we used; since we 
didn’t include multiple versions of each type, it 
would be risky to generalize these results.  
 
7. Future work  
 
Future research should explore the effect of email 
type on phishing susceptibility; and plans also 
include analysis of other behavioral factors that were 
collected in this study but not yet examined. 
Understanding these factors and characteristics will 
enable development of IT policies and practices, 
better defensive software tools, and more effective, 
perhaps tailored, awareness training for the most 
susceptible users. 
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